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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Certainly, the most pressing issue of modern times is to devel-
op a body of environmental law (that includes climate change)  
that is highly responsive to science. Without demeaning the many 
distinctions between the exercise of science and the practice of 
law,1 let me cut to the chase and declare that science is mostly 
about the “pursuit of truth” and law is mostly about “who wins.” 
Anybody who doubts this proposition should examine the  
radical differences between the “Supreme Court of Science” in  
the United States and the Supreme Court of Law. The Supreme 
Court of Science, the National Research Council, is not even  
an “agency” of the United States.2 It is a mad-cap collective of 
boards, councils, committees, and advisors. It has its own admin-
istrative structure, of course, but in behavior, output, and reputa-
tion, it does display a decidedly non-structured “pursuit-of-truth”  
personality.3 
The Supreme Court of Law hardly could be more different. In 
its practices of secrecy, isolation, choice of cases, in-house politick-
                                                                                                                   
 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Stimson Bullitt Professor of Environmental Law, Univer-
sity of Washington School of Law, Box 353020, 408 William H. Gates Hall, Seattle, WA 
98195-3020 | (206) 543-5182 | whr@uw.edu. This article is dedicated to two “Rachel Car-
sons” whose sterling careers have been devoted to protecting the oceans—Donna R. Christie 
and Alison Rieser. 
1. For the differences between science and law, see SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT 
THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995). 
2. Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 802 (D. D.C. 1975) (the author was an at-
torney in this case). 
3. The National Research Council, often called colloquially “The Academy,” traces its 
origins to an executive order of President Abraham Lincoln. There are eloquent histories  
of this extraordinary organization. For a collection of these, see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY § 1:13, at 399-44 & 399 n.7 (2005). See also PHIL-
LIP M. BOFFEY, THE BRAIN BANK OF AMERICA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE 
(1975), for an excellent introduction. 
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ing, and selection of members, this club is all about control.4  
The discipline of the legal system is quite remarkable when  
compared to the non-discipline of the scientific system. Instantly, 
upon utterance, all courts must fall in line with the latest word or  
directive. The same is true for attorneys who as officers of  
the court must implement that which is said without objection,  
quibbling, or scorn.5 
Of the two, the Supreme Court of Science and the Supreme 
Court of Law, the one that looks like the “clique of geniuses”  
at work in the Planet of the Apes is the Supreme Court of Law.6 
They are “Keepers of the Word.” 
Some years ago, I was reminded by my spouse that “sometimes 
there is no alternative other than to tell the truth.” I’m sure I 
found a better alternative on that occasion. 
But the point is well taken. And it has been taken to heart  
by the environmental movement. From the earliest times of  
modern environmentalism, activists have been inspired by the  
quiet desperation inherent in the idea that “sometimes there is  
no alternative other than to tell the truth.” Beginning in 1967,  
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) began to challenge the 
status quo with an “advancement of science” campaign against the  
old Pesticides Regulation Division of the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture.7 This bureaucracy was not exactly at the “cutting edge”  
of environmental science,8 and it soon would expire in the custom-
ary way by being given a new name and a new home (the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency). But, meanwhile, the EDF strategy 
was to “give voice” to Rachel Carson in places that were tone- 
                                                                                                                   
4. Literature on the U.S. Supreme Court, of course, is enormous. For a recent valua-
ble text, see MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RE-
LUCTANT PROTECTOR (2012). 
5. Having had a small taste of the discipline of law and a smaller taste of the disci-
pline of a military organization (the U.S. Marine Corps), I hope there has been a book writ-
ten comparing the two. If there has been, I have not read it. There is a book by WILLIAM IAN 
MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE 341 (2000), with these index entries under “Law”—
“punishing cowardice and misbehavior before the enemy,” “punishing looting and setting 
false alarms,” “punishing running away,” “punishing casting away arms,” “punishing failure 
to engage,” “failure to defend,” and “failure to rescue.” Could this be a short list of legal mal-
practice? 
6. “They are Official Science,” [Zira, female Ape Captor of the protagonist] said. 
“You must have noticed this already and you’ll have plenty of opportunities to con-
firm it. They learn an enormous amount from books. They are all decorated. Some 
of them are looked upon as leading lights in a narrow specialized field that re-
quires a good memory. Apart from that . . .” She made a gesture of contempt. 
PIERRE BOULLE, PLANET OF THE APES 128 (Del Rey Books 2001). 
7. See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Environmental Laws of the 1970s:  
They Looked Good on Paper, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17-18 (2010) [hereinafter Looked Good on 
Paper]. 
8. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES & TOX-
IC SUBSTANCES, 3 ENVTL. L. (West) § 5:1 (2012). 
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deaf to her knowledge on the dreadful consequences of the  
worldwide dissemination of chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides.9 
Rachel Carson was a powerful, passionate, and qualified voice. 
Any lawyer would be proud to have her as an expert. 
This tactical advantage of telling the truth quickly became  
a recognizable universal advantage that environmentalists strove 
to write into the “canonical”10 environmental laws of the 1970s. 
The National Environmental Policy Act was a near-miss in  
this regard.11 Then the “best available science” clauses arrived in  
a great rush, beginning with twelve of them in the Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act of 1972, eight more in the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, and several more after that in laws that included the 
1976 Magnuson Act that is now known as the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.12 
Yet there was a dangerous backlash hiding within this general 
strategy of giving voice to Rachel Carson. It put her in grave  
jeopardy in a world that was not content to bow to the rule of  
“science” with no strings attached. 
Predictably, a storm of law would attend the legislative  
choices to draw “best available science” into the service of advanc-
ing environmental policy. Questions might arise, for example, 
about the (1) Qualifications of Rachel Carson, (2) the Special  
Status of Purchased Science, (3) the Privileged Position of Defin-
ing Science, and (4) the Very Meaning of Science. 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
9. She cared passionately about the subject of how to maintain a sense of won-
der and believed the war was won or lost in childhood. She hoped her book would 
inspire adults and children alike to experience the sensory and emotional in na-
ture, and knew that if they did, they would have less appetite for those activities 
that threatened the living world. 
Linda Lear, Introduction to RACHEL CARSON, THE SENSE OF WONDER 11 (Harper Collins 
1998). 
10. The term is invented by Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: 
An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 281 (2010); see also Todd S. Aa-
gaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in Environmental Law, 
60 DUKE L.J. 1505 (2011). 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) states that “all agencies . . . shall . . . utilize a systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social 
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may 
have an impact on man’s environment.” 
I say a “near miss” because courts do not see within this language the clear direction—
and enforceability—of a mandate to use the “best available science.” See Friends of Endan-
gered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that NEPA does not 
require courts to “decide whether an [EIS] is based on the best scientific methodology avail-
able”); see also Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), abro-
gated on other grounds by Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council 55 U.S. 7 (2008). 
12. Looked Good on Paper, supra note 7, at 18. 
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This law is revealing itself quickly in the nascent world of  
climate change. It is being defined importantly by the U.S.  
Supreme Court and, in particular, its strongest “corporatist”  
members.13 
 
II. QUALIFICATIONS OF RACHEL CARSON 
 
This threshold question of who gets to speak on a matter of  
science is already a well-washed topic in the law books, under  
the general heading of Daubert.14 Customarily, this “gatekeeping  
function” is in the good hands of U.S. federal district judges.  
But, frankly, I worry about it when I see that this rule encourages  
motions to strike the testimony of world-class scientists (not only 
the qualified but the “best qualified”) on crucial issues of climate 
change.15 This can be done apparently without hesitation, shame, 
or personal or professional repercussions. This chapter certainly  
is not closed. 
 
III. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF  
PURCHASED SCIENCE 
 
One might think that the sensitive question of who pays for  
the science figures significantly in its fate in court, and it does.  
In the extraordinary book by Thomas O. McGarity and Wendy  
E. Wagner, Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public 
Health Research,16 sources of funding figure importantly in a full 
range of corrupting strategies, including “Packaging Science”  
and “Spinning Science.”17 Indeed, one of the early defamation  
cases in the wake of the DDT wars focused on whether the man in 
question had been “paid to lie.”18 
But have no doubt that giant corporations, such as Exxon-
Mobil, insist on their science on vital matters such as climate 
                                                                                                                   
13. “Corporatist” is defined as “of or characteristic of a corporative state or its corpora-
tions.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 409 (2d ed. 1983). 
14. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that “ ‘gen-
eral acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence”). 
15. See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 
2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) (denying Daubert motion to strike testimony of Dr. James Hansen), 
discussed in WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR. ET. AL., CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 81-83 (2011) 
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER]. 
16. (2008). 
17. See id. chs. 8, (subtitled “The Art of Assembling an Expert Group to Advance a 
Favored Outcome”), 9 (subtitled “The Art of Manipulating Public Perceptions about Credible 
Science”). 
18. See Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding an 
unsuccessful suit by pro-DDT expert; the alleged defamation was a charge of “liars,” maybe 
not “paid,” so the N.Y. TIMES was not liable for reporting on the events,). 
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change19 or residual oil in the wake of the spill of the Exxon  
Valdez.20 In one of the more ironic concessions to this fact, Justice 
Souter, in his opinion withdrawing punitive damages from the 
stricken fishermen in the wake of the Exxon spill, actually cited 
(but declined to rely upon in the interests of integrity!) a study  
of jury behavior paid for by Exxon that told us why this  
institution should be diminished in the interests of decisional  
fairness.21 
 
IV. GIVING DEFERENCE TO CHARLATANS 
 
In Massachusetts v. EPA,22 the Supreme Court stopped  
one vote short of giving deference on climate change to an agency 
that had become hopelessly politicized and completely wrong  
on the matter of science.23 But the Court showed itself quite  
ready to use its own ignorance of science as an asset, only to  
act as a handicapper on which part of the bureaucracy to bet. It 
must be understood that the shield of deference is now an extreme-
ly valuable currency within an agency. Managers are anxious  
to appropriate this asset, especially if they can hide behind the  
constraints it entails. 
Consider the deference that courts might have been inclined  
to extend to one Julie MacDonald, the former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks, at the United States  
Department of the Interior. The studies are in on this case,24 and, 
 
                                                                                                                   
19. Mark, would you provide me a slide on the seventeen thousand scientists? 
[Lee Raymond, Chairman and Chief Executive, Exxon Mobil, 1993-2005] asked an 
aide. 
A slide duly flashed on a wide screen. It depicted a petition organized by anti-
Kyoto campaigners and signed by thousands of scientists. The idea was to demon-
strate that many respectable scientists doubted key aspects of the I.P.C.C. consen-
sus about the likelihood of human contributions to global warming. The petition’s 
credibility had already been undermined by testimony presented to Congress 
demonstrating that its signatures included those of pop musicians such as the 
Spice Girls and James Brown. If Raymond knew about these problems, he did not 
care. 
STEVE COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: EXXONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER 88 (2012). 
20. See id. ch. 5. 
21. Compare CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER, supra note 15, at 172-75 (“Adequacy of 
Compensation and the Role of Retribution”), with William H. Rodgers, Jr., Punitive Deci-
sionmaking, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 89-94 (2009). Justice Souter will be aghast when he reads 
of the calculating ends to which ExxonMobil would go to undermine punitive awards. See 
COLL, supra note 19, at 312-14. 
22. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
23. See id. at 534-35; see also CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER, supra note 15, at  
60-71. 
24. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION: JULIE MACDONALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FISH, WILDLIFE AND 
PARKS (2007). 
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fortunately, the district judge who heard the case was not yet 
mesmerized by the doctrine of deference to the unnamed and  
the unknowable. 
In Western Watersheds Project v. Fish and Wildlife Service,  
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Idaho, upheld a challenge 
to a Fish and Wildlife Service’s rejection of a petition to list  
the greater sage-grouse under the Endangered Species Act.25 
Judge Winmill wrote: 
 
[T]he FWS decision was tainted by the inexcusable conduct 
of one of its own executives. Julie MacDonald, a Deputy As-
sistant Secretary who was neither a scientist nor a sage-
grouse expert, had a well-documented history of intervening 
in the listing process to ensure that the “best science” sup-
ported a decision not to list the species. Her tactics included 
everything from editing scientific conclusions to intimidat-
ing FWS staffers. Her extensive involvement in the sage-
grouse listing decision process taints the FWS’s decision 
and requires a reconsideration without her involvement.26 
 
Judge Winmill elaborated: 
 
What an odd process. Right at the moment where the “best 
science” was most needed, it was locked out of the room. 
The FWS argues that it cannot be compelled to cede control 
of a listing decision to experts. But the argument misses the 
mark. By excluding the experts from making even a rec-
ommendation, and then failing to document the experts’ 
discussions (beyond their votes), the FWS cannot demon-
strate that is [sic] applied the “best science.”27 
 
Judge Winmill added, “MacDonald had extensive involvement  
in the sage-grouse listing decision, used her intimidation tactics  
in this case, and altered the ‘best science’ to fit a not-warranted 
decision.”28 Judge Winmill’s decision in the sage-grouse listing  
case is a reminder of how important a vibrant judicial review is  
to the survival of the “best science” function. There are hundreds  
 
                                                                                                                   
25. 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho 2007); Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political In-
tegrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1605 (2007-2008). 
26. W. Watersheds Project, 535 F. Supp 2d at 1176. 
27. Id. at 1185. 
28. Id. at 1188; see also Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
2005 WL 2000928, at *15 (N.D. Cal 2005) (setting aside another “irregularity” occasioned by 
pressure from MacDonald “to reach an ‘ordained outcome’ regardless of the best science”). 
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of cases raising “best science” issues, and all these matters are 
vulnerable to being extinguished by casual resort to an unde-
served deference.29 
 
V. ECONOMICS IS NOT SCIENCE 
 
If the interpretation of “best science” includes economics,  
then the entire enterprise would be subject to self-cancellation  
under some ill-defined balancing standard. People who appreciate 
this reality—and who would hope to see it implemented—would 
place any and all written insistences that economics is not a  
science on a closely held list of banned books. This kind of thought 
would not be cited, honored, or mentioned. High on this list  
would be the book by Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools: The Logic 
of Deceit and Self-Deception.30 Trivers addresses directly the ques-
tion of whether economics is a science: 
 
The short answer is no. Economics acts like a science 
and quacks like one—it has developed an impressive math-
ematical apparatus and awards itself a Nobel Prize each 
year—but it is not yet a science. It fails to ground itself in 
underlying knowledge (in this case, biology). This is curious 
on its face, because models of economic activity must inevi-
tably be based on some notion of what an individual organ-
ism is up to. What are we trying to maximize? Here econo-
mists play a shell game. . . . [Economists] often implicitly 
assume . . . that market forces will naturally constrain the 
cost of deception in social and economic systems, but such a 
belief fails to correspond with what we know from daily life, 
much less biology more generally. Yet such is the detach-
ment of this “science” from reality that these contradictions 
arouse notice only when the entire world is hurtling into an 
economic depression based on corporate greed wedded to 
false economic theory. 
. . . . 
                                                                                                                   
29. Cf., in this regard, Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy, 485 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing a challenge to the Department of En-
ergy’s Waste Isolation Pilot Project, a nuclear waste repository in southeastern New Mexi-
co.) A qualified hydrologist described the agency characterization of the site as “a pattern of 
lies and deceptions designed to disguise the true hydrology of the . . . site.” Id. at 1095. This 
is heard by the court of appeals to be, at most, “a dispute among members of the scientific 
community.” Id. at 1099. See also Doremus, supra note 25, at 1641 (explaining that “[t]he 
key to enhancing political integrity is to enforce stronger role separation between career 
scientists, who should be encouraged and enabled to provide their best independent assess-
ments of the facts, and political appointees, who should be required to take political respon-
sibility for the choices they make among available policy options.”). 
30. (2011). 
68 JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 28:1 
Finally, when a science is a pretend science rather than 
the real thing, it also falls into sloppy and biased systems 
for evaluating the truth. Consider the following, a common 
occurrence during the past fifteen years. The World Bank 
advises developing countries to open their markets to for-
eign goods, let the markets rule, and slash the welfare 
state. When the program is implemented and fails, the di-
agnosis is simple: “Our advice was good but you failed to 
follow it closely enough.” There is little risk of being falsi-
fied with this kind of procedure.31 
 
Justice Antonin Scalia anticipated Trivers by writing in  
Bennett v. Spear,32 that economic concerns permeate the “best  
science” clauses.33 Justice Scalia pronounced that good science 
must be good economics: 
 
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency 
“use the best scientific and commercial data available” is to 
ensure that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on 
the basis of speculation or surmise. While this no doubt 
serves to advance the ESA’s overall goal of species preser-
vation, we think it readily apparent that another objective 
(if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid needless economic 
dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unin-
telligently pursuing their environmental objectives. That 
economic consequences are an explicit concern of the ESA  
is evidenced by § 1536(h), which provides exemption from  
§ 1536(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate where there are no rea-
sonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action and 
the benefits of the agency action clearly outweigh the bene-
fits of any alternatives. We believe the “best scientific and 
commercial data” provision is similarly intended, at least in 
part, to prevent uneconomic (because erroneous) jeopardy 
determinations. Petitioners’ claim that they are victims of 
such a mistake is plainly within the zone of interests that 
the provision protects. 34 
 
                                                                                                                   
31. Id. at 310-11, 313. 
32. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
33. Id. at 172, 176-77. 
34. Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added). The Scalia opinion does not address the peculiar 
reference in this “best science” clause to “commercial data.” See id. at 176. 
Fall 2012] GIVING VOICE TO RACHEL CARSON 69 
This position has been challenged, even mocked, but not by  
any source that matters.35 No other Justice has been moved to  
address this topic. 
Thus, in ironic fashion, the rise of environmentalism has 
brought with it the rise of science in law. The rise of science  
has buoyed hopes and expectations for addressing the “pressure 
cooker” of climate change.36 Yet, typical of the times, the largest 
obstacle to fulfillment of these higher ends is the strongest voice  
on today’s high court—a bullying, intimidating presence that has  
no discernible interest in the sweetest corners of science and  
no obvious commitment to its values. So far, the “best available 
science” has been shouted down, done away with by the snarling 
intemperance of the moment. 
Can we do better? Almost certainly, we can. The district courts 
are doing much better.37 In the longer run, the “pursuit of truth”  
is an odds-on favorite to defeat “the pursuit of advantage.”  
Lawyers have been attempting to fix the science now for several 
centuries, but they have come up short. 
Rachel Carson will again have her day. 
                                                                                                                   
35. My personal parody of this position is: 
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency “use the best scientific 
and commercial data available” is to ensure that the ESA not be implemented on 
the basis of power politics and economic influence. While this [clause] no doubt 
serves to advance the ESA’s overall goal of species preservation, we think it readi-
ly apparent that another objective (if not indeed the primary one) is to improve the 
quality of decisionmaking, enhance public confidence, and import technical accu-
racy so that environmental decisionmaking is not derailed by zealous and misguid-
ed interference. The confinement of economic objection to a rare and radically lim-
ited sidebar (§ 1536(h)) is definitive evidence that economic objection should not be 
smuggled in here under the implausible guise of a citizen suit. We believe the “best 
scientific and commercial data” provision is no way intended, neither in whole nor 
in part, to prevent uneconomic (because erroneous) jeopardy determinations. Peti-
tioners’ claim that they are victims of such a mistake is plainly without the zone of 
interests that the provision protects. 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA’s Insatiable Optimism, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,618, 
10,619 n.17 (2009). 
36. See generally Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes From a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: 
Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 1351 (2008). 
37. For one extraordinary account, see Aquifer Guardians in Urban Areas v. Federal 
Highway Administration, 779 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 
